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Abstract 
In this thesis, the focus lies on the determinants of changes in credit ratings. Multiple 
regression is used to study the relation between credit ratings and a quantity of selected 
economic variables. The study is restricted to the US market and the ratings have been 
assigned by Moody’s during the period 1999-2008. In line with previous studies, the short-
term interest rate and corporate profits are important determinants of rating changes. The 
result shows that other important factors are the capacity utilization rate and the rate of 
inflation. Finally, evidence is found that the number of rating changes is procyclical. This 
leads to the conclusion that if banks use the standardized approach in BIS II, bank capital 
requirements will be adjusted more frequently when the economy is growing.   
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1. Introduction 
Substantial progress has been made on measuring credit risk. The lack of traditional 
approaches to predict significant and sudden increases in credit risk exposure has accelerated 
the emergence of new models. Besides the purpose of measuring credit risk more accurately, 
new models aim to evaluate credit risk from a portfolio perspective and examine how 
derivatives can be used to alter the risk exposure. Nevertheless, many of the better proposals 
in traditional approaches are indeed used in the new models. In credit risk management, rating 
systems belong to the traditional approaches. Since, ratings reflect companies’ 
creditworthiness, they affect their possibilities of finding financing. Moreover, external 
ratings provided by credit rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor’s, can be used in the 
calculation of bank capital requirements.  
 
The value of external ratings has been questioned after the financial crisis in 2008. During the 
crisis, many former top-rated asset-backed securities (ABSs) either defaulted or were 
downgraded to a great extent. These events were followed by huge credit losses in banks and 
financial institutions all around the world. ABSs are usually traded in over-the-counter 
markets. The absence of supervised exchanges for these kinds of instruments, made it difficult 
to assess which banks that held huge amounts of bad debt. This uncertainty combined with 
high credit losses caused a temporarily stop in inter-bank lending. In view of the fact that 
ABSs, such as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), can have extraordinarily complex 
compositions, the superior credit rating evidently appealed to investors. Another attractive 
feature was the higher expected returns compared to other instruments in the same rating 
class. The credit rating agencies motivated their high credit ratings by referring to the 
diversification effect. Moreover, the assigned ratings were supported by highly advanced 
simulation models. Although globalisation has removed many barriers to investment across 
borders, the under-estimation of credit risk enabled large institutions to invest in these types 
of instruments. Typically, pension funds, insurance companies, and other large institutions 
have clear investment restrictions, which may prohibit them to invest in instruments with 
credit ratings below a specified limit.  
 
In this thesis, the focus lies on the determinants of changes in external credit ratings. The 
purpose is to analyze which economic factors that might explain the variation in credit ratings 
by using multiple regression. Furthermore, the influence of each explanatory will be 
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examined thoroughly. The study is restricted to the US market and the ratings have been 
assigned by Moody’s during the period 1999-2008. The methodology is organized such that a 
suitable functional form of the regression models is estimated first, followed by an 
examination of the validity of the assumptions in the regression models. Appropriate 
measures will be taken in case of any violations. Subsequently, relevant economic hypothesis 
tests will be carried out on the parameters of the estimated models. The result from this study 
will be compared with earlier research so as to examine whether the conclusions coincide 
with the general opinion. The outline of the thesis is as follows: chapter 2 presents the 
theoretical framework, the 3rd chapter discusses the applied methods and presents the 
collected data, chapter 4 contains the empirical result and the concluding remarks are 
provided in chapter 5.  
       
2. Theoretical framework 
In this section, the relevant theory is provided. The chapter begins with an examination of 
rating systems, and continues with credit rating agencies. Finally, a review of the previous 
research is provided.   
 
2.1 Rating systems  
A rating system places a financial instrument or a borrower into different categories.  If the 
rating refers to a borrower, the purpose is to reflect the creditworthiness of the borrower based 
on its ability to meet future repayments. The rating assigned to a financial instrument not only 
depends on the credit quality of the issuer, but also on collateral, options and other 
agreements that are specified in the financial contract. In general, rating systems place the 
object into high-quality or low-quality ratings. The vast majority of rating systems consider 
both qualitative and quantitative factors in dividing the rating classes. Examples of important 
factors are the history of borrowing and repayment, management quality, access to capital 
markets, market position, asset quality, extent of liabilities, and liquidity. Rating systems can 
be either internal or external. The internal systems are developed by banks, insurance 
companies and financial institutions, while external systems are provided by rating agencies 
such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.  Empirical research has showed that the internal 
ratings tend to coincide with external ratings. Carey (2001) has compared insurance 
companies’ internal ratings with external ratings, and found that both systems agree in 76, 10 
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% of the cases and vary by one grade or less in 90, 50 % of the cases. Rating systems can be 
used in the calculation of required economic capital. Some other areas in which they are used 
are the determination of loss reserves, pricing of loans, construction of risk reports and the 
setting of credit limits. The new Basel Capital Accord (BIS II) has acknowledged the 
variation in commercial credit risk due to external credit ratings, covenants, collateral etc. 
Therefore, BIS II makes the calculation of capital requirements more sensitive to credit risk 
exposure. Capital requirements can be calculated in any of the recommended techniques. 
According to the standardized model in BIS II, each loan is given a certain risk weight based 
on the company’s external credit rating.  
 
2.2 Credit rating agencies 
A credit rating agency rank different kinds of financial instruments, for instance, corporate 
bonds, government securities, and ABSs. Companies and sovereigns themselves are given 
ratings based on their ability to meet future obligations to investors (i.e. pay back coupons and 
nominal amounts). Moreover, credit rating agencies usually provides financial data, analysis 
and research. The leading institutions are Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s and Fitch. 
These companies have rated debt instruments since the beginning of the 1900s. The rating 
primarily affects the rate of return required by investors. Generally, improvements of the 
credit rating decreases the risk premium required by investors, whereas a decline leads to an 
increase. The ratings provided by credit rating agencies covers a large amount of outstanding 
instruments. According to Standard & Poor’s (2009), the total amount of outstanding debt 
rated by S&P globally is approximately US$32 trillion, in 100 countries. Standard and Poor’s 
rank a company from AAA (highest) to D (lowest) whereas Moody’s uses a grade from Aaa 
(highest) to C (lowest). Ratings are reconsidered at certain intervals or when major events 
occur.  
 
The credit rating agencies have recently been subject to a great deal of criticism. First, they 
have been criticized for having too close relationships with their clients’ management. This 
close relationship might initiate a reluctance to downgrade a credit rating, even though this is 
indeed justified. Second, credit ratings have been criticised on the basis that they lag new 
systems in forecasting credit quality deteriorations and improvements. Third, the judgement 
of rating agencies have been questioned after the financial crisis in 2008 when it turned out 
that many former top-rated ABSs either defaulted or were downgraded to a great extent. Thus, 
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the rating agencies clearly underestimated the risk, when they assigned the same rating to 
these instruments as to risk-free government bonds.  
 
2.3 Previous research  
Amato and Furfine (2004) have studied the influence of the state of the business cycle on 
credit ratings. Their purpose was to assess whether rating agencies are excessively procyclical 
in their assignment of ratings. They found little evidence of procyclicality. On the other hand, 
Amato and Furfine concluded that initial ratings and rating changes exhibit excess sensitivity 
to the business cycle. Koopman et al. (2009) used an intensity-based framework with the 
purpose of examining the relationship between macroeconomic fundamentals, cycles in 
defaults and rating activity. They found that the level of economic activity, bank lending 
conditions and financial market variables are important determinants of default and rating 
migration intensities. However, many macro fundamentals fall out when their model is 
improved by adding an unobserved dynamic component. The remaining important macro 
fundamentals are GDP-growth, the short term interest rate, default spreads and stock market 
volatilities. Taylor and Gonis (2009) investigated whether the credit quality of UK companies 
has deteriorated in recent years or if the credit rating agencies have become more stringent in 
the credit rating process. They applied an ordered probit analysis of 69 UK companies and 
found evidence that support both explanations. Moreover, among the significant explanatory 
variables were company size, long- and short-term solvency measures, profits, leverage ratios 
and cash flow. Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006) have examined determinants of sovereign 
credit ratings. They used a principal component analysis with the purpose of identifying the 
significant explanatory variables. The result point out that sovereign ratings are most 
influenced by government income, per capita income, the rate of inflation, real exchange 
changes, and the history of default. Moreover, the study showed that the level of corruption 
influence economic development and the quality of the governance of a country. Cheng and 
Neamtiu (2009) have investigated whether and how rating agencies respond to pressure and 
investor criticism for their ratings’ lack of timeliness in predicting bankruptcies. They found 
that credit rating agencies improve their rating timeliness, increase rating accuracy and reduce 
rating volatility. The authors suggest that when credit rating agencies’ market power is 
threatened by the possibility of increased regulatory intervention and/or reputation concerns, 
they respond by improving their credit analysis. Han et al. (2009) have examined stock 
market reactions to corporate credit rating changes in 26 emerging market countries included 
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in the Morgan Stanley Capital International Emerging Market Index. They used the ratings 
assigned by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s and compared the effect of credit rating changes 
in two emerging stock markets, namely local markets and American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs) markets. The authors only found that ADR markets react significantly on changes in 
credit ratings. Furthermore, the ADR markets react significantly to rating upgrades as well as 
to rating downgrades. The authors concluded that investors react more strongly in ADR 
markets because of greater expected bankruptcy costs and foreign exchange risks of those 
firms listed in both ADR- and local markets.  
 
3. Econometric methods and Data 
This section provides a general description of the applied method that is used to determine the 
economic factors of changes in credit ratings, and how the validity of the assumptions in the 
models is examined. Furthermore, the collected variables are described in detail. All 
computations are implemented using Eviews.     
 
3.1 Linear regression 
The starting point is to estimate the parameters of two separate linear regression models. The 
estimated parameters are obtained by ordinary least squares (OLS). In these regression 
models, Moody’s rating drift and rating activity are used as dependent variables. These 
variables are regressed on a constant and number of explanatory factors. A more detailed 
description of the independent and dependent variables is provided in chapter 3.6. The 
approach of OLS is to minimize the sum of squared differences. In matrix form, the function 
to be minimized is 
 
)()()( βββ &&&&&&&&& XyXyS −′−=             (3.1) 
 
where X is a (N x K) matrix, β&&&  is a (K x 1) vector and y, the dependent variable, is a (N x 1) 
vector. The first step to find the least squares solution is to differentiate equation (3.1) with 
respect to β&&& , and setting the result equal to zero. That is,  
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The OLS solution is then given by (see Verbeek, chapter 2, 2008) 
 
yXXXb ′′= −1)(          (3.3) 
 
It is assumed that X’X is invertible. This implies that there exists no strict multicollinearity. 
The dependent variable, y, can be written as  
 
eXby +=          (3.4) 
 
where b is the vector of estimated values of the true parameters and e is the vector of residuals 
with an expected value of zero. Hence, the predicted value for y is given by 
 
Xby =ˆ         (3.5) 
 
There are several assumptions imposed on the linear regression model. If the Gauss-Markov 
conditions hold, the OLS estimator b has a number of desirable properties. Nevertheless, the 
OLS estimator still has several attractive properties even under weaker conditions. The first 
condition has already been mentioned. This implies that the expected value of the error terms 
is equal to zero. Second, the error terms have the same variance. Third, it is assumed that the 
error terms are not correlated. The final condition states that X and e are independent. If all 
mentioned assumptions hold, the OLS estimator is the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) 
of the true parameter values. 
 
3.2 Statistical inference and Multicollinearity 
The models’ adequacy will be examined comprehensively by testing for specification errors, 
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, as well as to analyze the presence and severity of 
multicollinearity among the independent variables. When the correctly specified models have 
been found, hypothesis testing is going to point out which coefficients that are statistically 
significant. If the Gauss-Markov assumptions hold and the error terms are normally 
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distributed, it is possible to develop a stable test for hypothesis regarding the true unknown 
population parameter. The Jarque-Bera (JB) test will be carried out in order to test for 
normality. Given that the Gauss-Markov assumptions hold and the error terms are normally 
distributed, the estimator b is normally distributed with the mean equal to the true population 
parameter, β. In addition, the covariance matrix is defined as 
 
12 )'( −XXσ               (3.6) 
 
Based on this information, it follows that the test statistic in equation (3.7) is standard normal.  
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where σ is the unknown square root of the error variance and ckk is defined as the (k, k) 
element in 1)'( −XX . The term σ can be replaced by its estimate s. It can be shown (see 
Gujarati, chapter 5, 2006) that the t-statistic in equation (3.8) follows the Student’s t-
distribution with N-K degrees of freedom 
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The main difference between the normal- and t-distribution is that the t-distribution has fatter 
tails. However, the t-distribution approaches the normal as N-K gets larger. Using the result 
above, any hypothesis of interest can be tested. If a coefficient differs significant from zero, 
this implies that the independent variable has a statistically significant impact on the 
dependent variable.  
 
Multicollinearity is the statistical occurrence in multiple regressions when the independent 
variables are highly correlated. In the presence of multicollinearity, the OLS estimators are 
still BLUE. However, the regression model is likely to produce OLS estimators with large 
variances and standard errors. As a consequence, constructed confidence intervals for 
population parameters tend to be wider, which increases the possibility of accepting the 
hypothesis that the population coefficient is equal to zero. One typical indication of 
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multicollinearity is high R2 values and few significant test statistics. Accordingly, 
multicollinearity makes it difficult to assess the individual influence of each independent 
variable to the obtained R2. The variance inflation factor (VIF) together with auxiliary 
regressions will be used as diagnostic tools in an attempt to analyze the multicollinearity 
problem. The VIF is defined as 
 
21
1
kR
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−
=        (3.9) 
 
where 2kR  denotes the R
2 from an auxiliary regression upon the other independent variables. 
The VIF measures how much the variance of a specific coefficient is increased due to 
multicollinearity. For example, if the VIF of an independent variable takes the value 3, this 
means that the variance of the coefficient will be 3 times greater compared to the case when 
there is no correlation between this variable and the other independent variables. If 
multicollinearity is detected, a remedial measure may be the omission of collinear variables or 
the acquiring of new data.  
 
3.3 Heteroskedasticity 
If the error variance is not constant, we have the situation of heteroskedasticity. Given that the 
other assumptions in the linear regression model hold, the OLS estimators are still linear and 
unbiased. However, they are no longer efficient estimators, not even asymptotically. Thus, the 
variances of the OLS estimators are biased and the hypothesis tests based on F- and t-
distributions becomes unreliable. White’s test is carried out in order to detect any 
heteroskedasticity in the regression models. In this test, the squared residuals are regressed on 
a constant and on each independent variable, their cross products, and their squared values. 
For example, in a model with two independent variables we run the following auxiliary 
regression: 
 
tttttttt XBXBXXBXBXBBe η++++++=
2
36
2
2532433221
2         (3.10) 
 
where X2 and X3 represent the independent variables and the term tη  is the residual term. 
Moreover, additional powers of the independent variables might be included in regression 
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(3.10). The obtained R2 value from regression (3.10) together with the number of observations 
(=N) are used to calculate the test statistic. Under the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity, 
the test statistic  
 
2
1
2 ~ −kNR χ         (3.11) 
 
is asymptotically Chi-distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the number of independent 
variables in the auxiliary regression, excluding the intercept. If heteroskedasticity is found, 
the method of weighted least squares (WLS) can be carried out as a remedial measure given 
that the true variances of the regression coefficients are known. Nevertheless, the true error 
variance is hardly ever known. Other more appropriate measures are to re-specify the model 
or to use White’s heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors.   
 
3.4 Serial correlation 
In time-series data, serial correlation implies that the error terms are correlated. The reason 
for this may be data manipulation or model specification error. The consequences of serial 
correlation are very similar to the case of heteroskedasticity. If the error terms are correlated, 
the OLS estimators are still linear and unbiased, but they are no longer efficient. As a result, 
the standard t- and F-tests are unreliable. Furthermore, the computed R2 might be unreliable 
for the reason that the error variance is a biased estimator of its true value. There are several 
tests of serial- or autocorrelation. Some examples are the Durbin-Watson d test, the runs test, 
the iterative Cochrane-Orcutt method, and the Breusch-Godfrey LM test; see Verbeek (2008, 
Chapter 4) for illustrative examples. Moreover, a simple graphical examination of the OLS 
residuals may provide valuable information about the likelihood of serial correlation. The 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test will be employed so as to test for serial correlation. This is an 
asymptotic test based upon the R2 of an auxiliary regression together with the selected 
quantity of lagged residuals. If K and F denote the number of lagged residuals and 
independent variables, the auxiliary regression model is defined as 
 
tktKtFtFtt eaeaXBXBBe ε+++++++= −− ...... 11221      (3.12) 
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If the R2 from regression (3.12) is multiplied with the number of observations, the obtained 
test statistic is Chi-distributed under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. If serial 
correlation is found, the model will be corrected with appropriate measures. Generalized 
least squares (GLS) estimation may be one remedial measure. Another common approach is 
to re-estimate the model while adjusting its standard errors. The standard errors that are 
consistent with both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are called the Newey-West 
(1987) standard errors. According to this approach, the estimated covariance matrix is given 
by  
 
1
1
'*
1
1
')(ˆ
−
=
−
=












= ∑∑
T
t
tt
T
t
tt xxTSxxbV          (3.13) 
 
where  
 
∑∑∑
+=
−−−
−
==
++=
T
js
sjsjssjss
H
j
j
T
t
ttt xxxxeewT
xxe
T
S
1
''
1
11
'2* )(
11
       (3.14) 
 
with Hjw j /1−= . Note that in the above example H denote the lag length. The Newey-
West standard errors are computed from equation (3.13). In the presence of autocorrelation 
and/or heteroskedasticity, standard tests from a linear model with Newey-West standard 
errors are said to be asymptotically valid.  
 
3.5 Stability test 
To test for possible specification errors, the RESET test will be employed. According to 
Ramsey (1969), under the null hypothesis, nonlinear functions of equation (3.5) should not 
help in explaining the dependent variable. The RESET test is performed by running 
regression (3.4) once more and adding nonlinear powers of equation (3.5). If Q is equal to 
the number of powers, the functional form of the auxiliary regression is defined as 
 
 13
t
Q
tQtttt ykykykbxy η+++++= ˆ...ˆˆ
3
3
2
2
'       (3.15) 
 
where k stands for the coefficient for the power of tYˆ , and tη  is the residual from the model. 
The R2 obtained from model (3.4) together with the R2 from regression (3.15) are used to 
produce an F-statistic. This can be used to test the hypothesis that all coefficients for the 
power of tYˆ  are equal to zero. The hypothesis that the model is correctly specified is 
accepted if the F-statistic is not statistically significant.    
  
3.6 Data 
The data employed is quarterly and are taken from Thomson DataStream. The sample period 
ranges from the first quarter in 1999 to the last quarter in 2008. The descriptive statistics and 
the corresponding abbreviation for each collected variable are provided in table 16 and 17, 
respectively. The study is restricted to the US market and the obtained corporate ratings have 
been assigned by Moody’s. For rating changes, Moody’s rating activity and rating drift are 
used. The rating activity is defined as the number of issuer rating changes, divided with all 
rated issuers, whereas the rating drift is defined as the difference between the upgrades and 
the downgrades, divided with the number of rated issuers. The rating drift might be 
interpreted as the overall change in creditworthiness, where positive values indicate an 
improvement. Conversely, negative values imply deterioration in creditworthiness. The rating 
activity, on the other hand, is an intensity measure of the number of rating changes. The data 
set of independent variables consists of the 3-month treasury bill rate, the growth in the gross 
domestic product (GDP) and the producer price index (PPI), aggregate corporate net cash 
flows, aggregate corporate profits, the unemployment rate, the national bureau’s (NBER) 
business cycle, the capacity utilization rate, the CEO confidence index, and a trade weighted 
value of the US dollar against major currencies. Economic theory suggests that the short-term 
interest rate is negatively related to upgrades, because the higher the interest rate, the more 
expensive it is for companies to borrow new capital. The growth in PPI (inflation) is closely 
connected with the short-term interest rate for the reason that high rates of inflation advocate 
for an increase in the short-term interest rate. Therefore, it is expected that the rate of inflation 
is negatively related to upgrades. Since, the GDP measures the market value of all final goods 
and services produced in the economy, it is considered as a measure of the country’s 
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economic performance. Therefore, it is expected that GDP growth is positively related to 
upgrades.  As suggested in economic theory, corporate profits and improvements in 
creditworthiness are positively correlated. Corporate net cash flow is another measure of a 
company’s financial health. Accordingly, it is expected that cash flow is positively correlated 
with upgrade movements, and negatively with downgrades.  Both cash flow and profits are 
measured in billions of dollars. It is commonly argued that an increasing rate of 
unemployment is associated with lower levels of disposable income and higher costs on 
society. In view of the fact that a higher rate of unemployment reduces the demand for 
products and services, there should be a positive relationship between downgrades and the 
rate of unemployment. The NBER business cycle is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
economy is in recession and 0 if the economy is in expansion mode. According to NBER 
(2003), a recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, 
lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, 
industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales. A recession begins just after the economy 
reaches a peak of activity and ends as the economy reaches its trough. Between trough and 
peak, the economy is in an expansion. Intuitively, economic recession ought to be positively 
related to downgrades, while expansion is positively related to upgrades. The capacity 
utilization rate is defined as the ratio of actual output to the potential output. Thus, it is 
interpreted as an overall efficiency measure of the economy. Since, the capacity utilization 
rate is linked to total demand, it is believed that the capacity utilization rate is positively 
related to upgrades. The CEO confidence index is a regular survey of Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) in the United States. Approximately 100 CEOs are interview each occasion 
and they come from a variety of industries. The index reflects their views on issues such as 
industry concerns, the economic outlook, and future business plans. It ranges from 0 to 100, 
where values of 50 or higher indicate that the CEOs are more positive than negative in their 
views on the business conditions. It is expected that an optimistic view on the business 
conditions is positively related to upgrades. The trade-weighted value of the US dollar against 
major currencies is an index with base period value of 100 on March, 1973.  A decrease in the 
value of the US dollar makes US goods cheaper in the global market, followed by an increase 
in total demand. Hence, it is expected that the currency index is negatively related to 
upgrades.  
 
 
 15
4. Result 
To begin with, Moody’s rating drift and rating activity have been regressed on a constant and 
all 10 independent variables. The results are given in table 1 and 2. As we can see, the R2 is 
fairly high whereas most t-ratios are insignificant. In table 1, every independent variable, 
including the intercept, is insignificant at the 5 % level. This might indicate a presence of 
severe multicollinearity among the independent variables. The pair wise correlation matrix for 
all included variables is presented in table 17. It appears that several correlations are 
remarkably high, with a number of values exceeding 0, 8. In some cases, there is a more or 
less perfect correlation. The variables that are particularly highly correlated are the 
unemployment rate and the 3-month bill rate, aggregate profits and the exchange-rate 
measure, along with aggregate profits and aggregate cash flows. In order to analyze the 
severity of multicollinearity, each independent variable has been regressed on a constant and 
the remaining independent variables. Moreover, the obtained values of the R2 have been used 
to calculate the VIF. The results are presented in table 3. As the table shows, six regressions 
have R2 values in excess 0,9; the F-test shows that every R2 is statistically significant at the 5 
% level, suggesting that some independent variables are highly collinear with other 
independent variables. The multicollinearity problem is confirmed by the large variance 
inflations factors. The variables that exhibit especially high VIF values are the capacity 
utilization rate, the short-term interest rate, aggregate cash flows, aggregate profits, the 
unemployment rate, and the exchange-rate measure. Typically, a VIF value greater than 10 is 
an indication of severe multicollinearity. For that reason, it may be desirable to modify the 
regression models in order to reduce the multicollinearity problem. The proposed solution has 
been to omit an appropriate number of variables. The variables that have been excluded are 
the unemployment rate, aggregate cash flows, and the exchange-rate measure. The auxiliary 
regressions without these variables are presented in table 4. Undoubtedly, the exclusion of 
three independent variables significantly decreased the variance inflation factors. Moreover, 
the obtained F-values are lower, but still significant at the 5 % level. The new models, based 
on the 7 remaining independent variables, are presented in table 5 and 6. As expected, the 
obtained value of the R2 has decreased somewhat in both models. However, several 
independent variables are significant at the 5 % level. The RESET tests of model 3 and 4 are 
presented in table 7 and 8. As we can see, the computed F-values are equal to 22, 02 and 0, 
44. It can be seen that the p-value of obtaining an F-value of as much as 0, 44 or greater is 64, 
57 %. Hence, the hypothesis that all coefficients for the power of tYˆ   are equal to zero is 
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accepted at the 5 % level. In table 7, the F-statistic is significant at the 5 % level. The 
conclusion we draw from this is that model 4 is correctly specified, whereas model 3 is 
misspecified. An alternative model of the rating drift is presented in table 9. In this model, the 
absolute values of aggregate profits and the short-term interest rate have been replaced by 
their respective log values. Furthermore, cross products and squared independent variables 
have been included in the regression equation. Evidently, nonlinear functions are significant 
and suggest that nonlinearities are important in explaining changes in the rating drift. The 
RESET test of model 5 can be found in table 10. The F-value has taken a value of 1, 73 and 
the corresponding p-value is equal to 19, 65 %. The conclusion is that model 5 is correctly 
specified, based on the RESET test.  
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        Note: Actual- and fitted values together with the residuals are plotted for model 5, during the sample period 1999Q1-2008Q4  
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        Figure 2: Graphical illustration of model 4 
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          Note: Actual- and fitted values together with the residuals are plotted for model 4, during the sample period 1999Q1-2008Q4  
 
 
 
 
The obtained values of the R2 in model 4 and 5 are fairly high. The independent variables in 
model 5 explain approximately 95 % of the variance in the rating drift, whereas the 
independent variables in model 4 are able to explain 82, 12 % of the variance in the rating 
activity. Obviously, the estimated regression lines fit the actual observations well. This can be 
seen from figure 1 and 2, which plots the actual- and fitted values from model 4 and 5. 
Moreover, the residuals from model 4 and 5 are plotted alongside with the fitted- and actual 
values. From the regressions we see that the intercept term in both models is significant at the 
5 % level. In model 5, the effect of the log value of the short-term interest rate, the rate of 
inflation, and the log value of aggregate profits are statistically significant at the 5 % level. 
The slope coefficient of the log value of the interest rate has taken the value 17, 26. This 
means that if the interest rate increases by 1 %, on the average, the rating drift increases by 0, 
1726 units. The slope coefficient of the log value of aggregate profits is equal to 29, 51. 
Hence, if aggregate profits increases by 1 %, on average, the rating drift increases by 0, 2951 
units. The increase in PPI (inflation) has a negative effect on the rating drift. Holding other 
variables constant, as the PPI goes up by one percentage point, on average, the rating drift 
goes down by 1, 46. The F-statistic in table 9 has taken the value of 47, 56, which is 
significant at the 5 % level. Therefore, there is evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the 
independent variables collectively have a significant effect on the rating drift. In model 4, the 
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effect of the capacity utilization rate, the short-term interest rate, the NBER business cycle, 
and aggregate profits are statistically significant at the 5 % level. The slope coefficient of the 
short-term interest rate has taken the value 0, 96. This implies that if the bill rate increases by 
1 %, ceteris paribus, the rating activity will increase by approximately 0, 96 units. The value 
of the coefficient of aggregate profits is equal to -0, 0034, meaning that if aggregate profits 
increases with 1 billion dollars, the rating activity declines by approximately 0, 0034 units. 
The NBER business cycle coefficient of -4, 03 imply that if the economy is in recession, the 
rating activity is about 4, 03 units lower. The coefficient of the capacity utilization rate has 
taken the value -1, 17. Accordingly, if the capacity utilization rate increases with 1 unit, 
ceteris paribus, the rating activity decreases with approximately 1, 17 units. The histogram of 
the residuals in model 4 and 5 are presented in figure 3 and 4. Moreover, the figures provide 
the JB test statistics and their corresponding p-values. The histograms indicate that there is no 
reason to reject the hypothesis that the residuals in model 5 and 4 are normally distributed. 
The JB statistics takes the values 3, 01 and 1, 00. Thus, the hypothesis of normality is 
accepted in both cases at the 5 % significance level.      
 
 
 
 
        Figure 3: Histogram and normality test (Model 5)                                    
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      Figure 4: Histogram and normality test (Model 4) 
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The White test has been carried out in order to test for heteroskedasticity. The result is 
presented in table 11 and 12, respectively. As we can see, the test statistics takes the values of 
21, 30 and 32, 99. Hence, the test statistics are not significant at the 5 % level and we accept 
the hypothesis that there is no heteroskedasticity in any of the models.  
 
 
             Figure 5:  Residuals against lagged residual from model 4 
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             Figure 6:  Residuals against lagged residual from model 5 
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The residuals have been plotted against the lagged residual (lagged by 1), as shown in figure 5 
and 6, which depicts the residuals from model 4 and 5. An examination of figure 5 shows that 
the residuals seem to exhibit positive autocorrelation while figure 6 shows no systematic 
pattern among the residuals. Hence, the graphical plotting of the residuals suggests that model 
4 suffers from serial correlation. The result of the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM tests 
can be found in table 13 and 14. The LM test for model 5 produces a test statistic of 1, 27, 
which implies that the hypothesis of no serial correlation should be accepted. For model 4, the 
test statistic of 16, 10 clearly imply that the null hypothesis should be rejected against the 
alternative of serial correlation. As the test strongly indicates the presence of serial 
correlation, it seems appropriate to use OLS while computing corrected Newey-West standard 
errors. Recall that these standard errors also allow for heteroskedasticity. The result is 
presented in table 15. Qualitatively, the conclusions do not change. As before, the capacity 
utilization rate, the short-term interest rate, the business cycle and aggregate profits are 
significant at the 5 % level. The standard errors of the significant coefficients have taken the 
values of 0, 26, 0, 37, 1, 55 and 0,001. In model 4, the equivalent standard errors were equal 
to 0, 26, 0, 36, 1, 04 and 0, 001. Comparing model 4 with model 6, we see that the standard 
errors are slightly lower in model 6.   
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5. Conclusions  
The main purpose of this thesis was to analyze credit ratings over time and search for the 
determinants of changes in credit ratings. Using the rating drift and the rating activity of US 
corporations from Moody’s over the period 1999-2008, the influence of a quantity of 
economic factors was examined with multiple regression. In line with previous studies, the 
short-term interest rate and corporate profits are important determinants of rating changes. 
These two economic variables are significant in explaining both the number of rating changes 
as well as the direction in overall creditworthiness. Other important candidates are the rate of 
inflation, the capacity utilization rate, and the state of the business cycle. Since, the rating 
activity is lower in recessions, it seems that there is indeed procyclicality in the number of 
rating changes.  
 
The estimated coefficients for all of the significant variables had the expected signs, except 
for the coefficient of the short-term interest rate. The result pointed out that the short-term 
interest rate has a positive relationship to the rating drift in addition to the rating activity. 
Hence, a higher interest rate is good for rating upgrades and is associated with a higher 
intensity in the number of rating changes. Generally, we would expect that the higher the 
interest rate, the more expensive it is for companies to borrow new capital. The result might 
have two reasons. First, the positive sign may come about due to sampling error. An 
alternative explanation is that the short-term interest rate is positively related to aggregate 
profits. Another interesting finding is that the CEO confidence index was insignificant in each 
model. Therefore, corporate leaders’ subjective opinions about the economic conditions do 
not have a significant impact on rating changes.  
 
The findings may have implications for policymakers. According to the standardized model in 
BIS II, banks will base their capital requirements on external credit ratings. If the number of 
changes in credit ratings is procyclical, bank capital requirements will be adjusted more 
frequently when the economy is growing.   
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7. Appendix 
 
Table 1: Linear regression results (Model 1)  
 Dependent Variable: USMDRATD 
     
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
GDP -0.636083 1.107420 -0.574383 0.5701 
PPI -0.318100 0.468706 -0.678678 0.5027 
USCAPUTLQ 1.043783 0.909399 1.147772 0.2604 
USCEOCNFR 0.054194 0.069604 0.778607 0.4425 
USGBILL3 -0.435725 1.342830 -0.324482 0.7479 
USMFNWA 0.015313 0.017464 0.876862 0.3878 
USNBERBCR 0.358594 2.130963 0.168278 0.8675 
USPROFTSB -0.000221 0.012638 -0.017451 0.9862 
USUNTOTQ -4.515100 2.768435 -1.630921 0.1137 
USXTW 0.041476 0.232749 0.178199 0.8598 
C -86.17682 99.34308 -0.867467 0.3928 
     
R-squared 0.808658     F-statistic 12.25610 
Adjusted R-squared 0.742678     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Note: Sample period: 1999Q1-2008Q4 
 
 
Table 2: Linear regression results   (Model 2) 
 Dependent Variable: USMDRATA       
     
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
GDP -0.410358 0.601421 -0.682314 0.5005 
PPI -0.011661 0.254546 -0.045812 0.9638 
USCAPUTLQ 0.290113 0.493879 0.587417 0.5615 
USCEOCNFR 0.006655 0.037801 0.176051 0.8615 
USGBILL3 0.204005 0.729268 0.279740 0.7817 
USMFNWA 0.009848 0.009484 1.038366 0.3077 
USNBERBCR -2.410243 1.157289 -2.082662 0.0462 
USPROFTSB -0.002484 0.006863 -0.361937 0.7200 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
USUNTOTQ 2.959053 1.503489 1.968124 0.0587 
USXTW 0.348114 0.126402 2.754015 0.0101 
C -55.99951 53.95150 -1.037960 0.3079 
     
R-squared 0.872596     F-statistic 19.86225 
Adjusted R-squared 0.828664     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
      
Note: Sample period: 1999Q1-2008Q4 
 
Table 3: Auxiliary Regressions, 10 explanatory variables 
Dependent variable Value of R2 Value of F Is F significant* 
                              
VIF 
GDP 0,5446 3,99 Yes 2,20 
PPI 0,4323 2,54 Yes 1,76 
USCAPUTLQ 0,9661 94,87 Yes 29,46 
USCEOCNFR 0,6052 5,11 Yes 2,53 
USGBILL3 0,9632 87,33 Yes 27,20 
USMFNWA 0,9812 173,87 Yes 53,16 
USNBERBCR 0,7149 8,36 Yes 3,51 
USPROFTSB 0,9890 299,10 Yes 90,73 
USUNTOTQ 0,9509 64,52 Yes 20,36 
USXTW 0,9713 112,70 Yes 34,81 
 
Note:  * Significant at the 5 % level 
 
 
 
Table 4: Auxiliary Regressions, 7 explanatory variables  
Dependent variable Value of R2 
                   
Value of F Is F significant* 
                              
VIF 
GDP 0,5090 5,70 Yes 2,04 
PPI 0,3698 3,23 Yes 1,59 
USCEOCNFR 0,5472 6,65 Yes 2,21 
USGBILL3 0,8148 24,20 Yes 5,40 
USNBERBCR 0,5484 6,68 Yes 2,21 
USPROFTSB 0,3713 3,25 Yes 1,59 
USCAPUTLQ 0,8398 28,83 Yes 6,24 
 
Note: * Significant at the 5 % level  
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Table 5: Linear regression results (Model 3) 
Dependent Variable: USMDRATD   
          
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -86.83977 31.57965 -2.749865 0.0097 
GDP -0.010804 1.101592 -0.009808 0.9922 
PPI -0.233272 0.459512 -0.507651 0.6152 
USCAPUTLQ 0.820794 0.432354 1.898432 0.0667 
USCEOCNFR 0.095461 0.067133 1.421963 0.1647 
USGBILL3 1.442219 0.617969 2.333804 0.0260 
USNBERBCR 2.231675 1.748679 1.276206 0.2111 
USPROFTSB 0.006476 0.001728 3.746574 0.0007 
     
     R-squared 0.774756     F-statistic 15.72398 
Adjusted R-squared 0.725483     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Note: Sample period: 1999Q1-2008Q4 
 
 
 
Table 6: Linear regression results (Model 4) 
Dependent Variable: USMDRATA   
          
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 113.7803 18.69997 6.084517 0.0000 
USCAPUTLQ -1.166844 0.256019 -4.557641 0.0001 
GDP -0.523995 0.652310 -0.803291 0.4277 
PPI -0.160096 0.272101 -0.588368 0.5604 
USCEOCNFR 0.041655 0.039753 1.047858 0.3026 
USGBILL3 0.959473 0.365932 2.621996 0.0133 
USNBERBCR -4.032523 1.035484 -3.894335 0.0005 
USPROFTSB -0.003386 0.001023 -3.307997 0.0023 
     
     R-squared 0.821696     F-statistic 21.06695 
Adjusted R-squared 0.782692     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Note: Sample period: 1999Q1-2008Q4 
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Table 7: Ramsey’s RESET test (model 3) 
     
     F-statistic 22.01840     Probability 0.000001 
Log likelihood ratio 36.13459     Probability 0.000000 
     
     Dependent Variable: USMDRATD   
          
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 241.7856 55.80176 4.332938 0.0002 
GDP -0.147951 0.725438 -0.203947 0.8398 
PPI -0.319089 0.302383 -1.055249 0.2997 
USCAPUTLQ -2.872928 0.647380 -4.437775 0.0001 
USCEOCNFR -0.054156 0.058829 -0.920555 0.3646 
USGBILL3 -0.296200 0.483980 -0.612007 0.5451 
USNBERBCR -4.270310 1.727582 -2.471843 0.0193 
USPROFTSB -0.002272 0.001744 -1.302458 0.2027 
FITTED^2 -0.524613 0.084037 -6.242632 0.0000 
FITTED^3 -0.024097 0.004568 -5.275533 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.908730     F-statistic 33.18837 
Adjusted R-squared 0.881349     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
 
Table 8: Ramsey’s RESET test (model 4) 
     
     F-statistic 0.443842     Probability 0.645712 
Log likelihood ratio 1.166405     Probability 0.558108 
     
     Dependent Variable: USMDRATA   
          
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -28.50817 758.7490 -0.037573 0.9703 
USCAPUTLQ 0.336696 8.245268 0.040835 0.9677 
GDP 0.354436 3.943911 0.089869 0.9290 
PPI 0.139494 1.128298 0.123633 0.9024 
USCEOCNFR -0.030464 0.301095 -0.101177 0.9201 
USGBILL3 -0.336772 6.688208 -0.050353 0.9602 
USNBERBCR 1.574077 28.77567 0.054702 0.9567 
USPROFTSB 0.001544 0.024851 0.062147 0.9509 
FITTED^2 0.086971 0.342659 0.253812 0.8014 
FITTED^3 -0.001654 0.005343 -0.309514 0.7591 
     
     R-squared 0.826820     F-statistic 15.91448 
Adjusted R-squared 0.774866     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Table 9: Linear regression results (Model 5) 
Dependent Variable: USMDRATD   
     
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C -221.7592 20.71807 -10.70366 0.0000 
USCAPUTLQ 0.054077 0.305547 0.176985 0.8608 
GDP -0.289702 0.616036 -0.470267 0.6418 
LOG(USGBILL3) 17.25666 1.807061 9.549571 0.0000 
USCEOCNFR 0.080428 0.044230 1.818374 0.0797 
PPI -1.463189 0.430838 -3.396149 0.0021 
LOG(USPROFTSB) 29.50559 4.422668 6.671446 0.0000 
USNBERBCR 0.926055 1.130807 0.818932 0.4197 
USGBILL3*USPROFTSB -0.004485 0.000764 -5.868033 0.0000 
PPI*USNBERBCR -1.437749 0.667216 -2.154847 0.0399 
PPI^2 0.554258 0.175105 3.165283 0.0037 
USGBILL3^2 0.159098 0.103448 1.537958 0.1353 
     
R-squared 0.949202     F-statistic 47.56371 
Adjusted R-squared 0.929245     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Note: Sample period: 1999Q1-2008Q4 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Ramsey’s RESET test (model 5) 
     
     F-statistic 1.733409     Probability 0.196481 
Log likelihood ratio 5.006731     Probability 0.081809 
     
Dependent Variable: USMDRATD   
          
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -122.7016 59.87269 -2.049376 0.0506 
USCAPUTLQ 0.019157 0.326226 0.058723 0.9536 
GDP -0.279039 0.602751 -0.462942 0.6473 
LOG(USGBILL3) 9.305322 4.680785 1.987983 0.0574 
USCEOCNFR 0.045304 0.047071 0.962457 0.3447 
PPI -0.828913 0.540793 -1.532774 0.1374 
LOG(USPROFTSB) 16.45073 8.296082 1.982952 0.0580 
USNBERBCR -0.132579 1.243474 -0.106620 0.9159 
USGBILL3*USPROFTSB -0.002308 0.001391 -1.659178 0.1091 
PPI*USNBERBCR -0.855509 0.730481 -1.171159 0.2522 
PPI^2 0.296671 0.221881 1.337075 0.1928 
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Table 10 (continued) 
USGBILL3^2 0.056389 0.115202 0.489479 0.6286 
FITTED^2 -0.063271 0.049517 -1.277764 0.2126 
FITTED^3 -0.002067 0.002279 -0.906788 0.3728 
     
     R-squared 0.955178     F-statistic 42.62125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.932767     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     
 
 
 
Table 11: Auxiliary regression White test (Model 5) 
F-statistic 1.082409     Probability 0.433063 
Obs*R-squared 21.30298     Probability 0.379496 
     Dependent Variable: The squared residuals from model 5 
(RESID^2)   
          Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C -1591.605 1273.250 -1.250033 0.2265 
USCAPUTLQ -24.50587 32.18653 -0.761370 0.4558 
USCAPUTLQ^2 0.147085 0.204570 0.718996 0.4809 
GDP -0.295225 2.987016 -0.098836 0.9223 
GDP^2 -0.501294 1.666984 -0.300719 0.7669 
LOG(USGBILL3) -4.753163 10.89122 -0.436421 0.6674 
(LOG(USGBILL3))^2 -34.16232 21.77724 -1.568717 0.1332 
USCEOCNFR 0.041344 0.592219 0.069813 0.9451 
USCEOCNFR^2 -0.002018 0.005336 -0.378074 0.7096 
PPI -0.291428 1.132389 -0.257357 0.7997 
PPI^2 -1.380038 0.903241 -1.527873 0.1430 
LOG(USPROFTSB) 736.0982 476.8008 1.543828 0.1391 
(LOG(USPROFTSB))^2 -52.00426 33.82954 -1.537244 0.1407 
USNBERBCR 4.767476 5.730421 0.831959 0.4158 
USGBILL3*USPROFTSB 0.005893 0.008791 0.670397 0.5107 
(USGBILL3*USPROFTSB)^2 -5.00E-07 6.16E-07 -0.812075 0.4268 
PPI*USNBERBCR -2.176597 2.585457 -0.841861 0.4103 
(PPI*USNBERBCR)^2 0.080907 1.497886 0.054014 0.9575 
(PPI^2)^2 0.250662 0.190288 1.317278 0.2034 
USGBILL3^2 5.449899 3.330535 1.636343 0.1182 
(USGBILL3^2)^2 -0.058656 0.035976 -1.630391 0.1195 
     
R-squared 0.532574     Adjusted R-squared 0.040548 
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Table 12: Auxiliary regression White test (Model 4) 
     
     F-statistic 0.691589     Probability 0.766794 
Obs*R-squared 32.98591     Probability 0.517174 
     
     Dependent Variable: The squared residuals from model 4 
(RESID^2*)    
          
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 7637.747 12101.69 0.631131 0.5557 
USCAPUTLQ -199.1698 312.8532 -0.636624 0.5524 
USCAPUTLQ^2 1.302828 1.972116 0.660624 0.5381 
USCAPUTLQ*GDP 10.94274 6.073263 1.801790 0.1315 
USCAPUTLQ*PPI 0.649141 3.690360 0.175902 0.8673 
USCAPUTLQ*USCEOCNFR -0.035968 0.314063 -0.114525 0.9133 
USCAPUTLQ*USGBILL3 1.285258 3.684709 0.348809 0.7414 
USCAPUTLQ*USNBERBCR 11.88389 12.13819 0.979049 0.3725 
USCAPUTLQ*USPROFTSB -0.018103 0.013016 -1.390861 0.2230 
GDP -839.8483 455.6005 -1.843388 0.1246 
GDP^2 -17.89860 9.950065 -1.798842 0.1320 
GDP*PPI 3.367314 8.664436 0.388636 0.7135 
GDP*USCEOCNFR 1.220463 0.706978 1.726309 0.1449 
GDP*USGBILL3 -14.39066 8.153895 -1.764882 0.1379 
GDP*USNBERBCR -8.305218 17.91251 -0.463655 0.6624 
GDP*USPROFTSB -0.015468 0.010134 -1.526364 0.1874 
PPI -14.44914 258.3842 -0.055921 0.9576 
PPI^2 -1.450199 3.406001 -0.425778 0.6880 
PPI*USCEOCNFR -0.593943 0.414271 -1.433705 0.2111 
PPI*USGBILL3 -3.289852 5.306051 -0.620019 0.5624 
PPI*USNBERBCR -25.18277 16.71707 -1.506411 0.1923 
PPI*USPROFTSB 0.006683 0.007474 0.894150 0.4122 
USCEOCNFR -0.821733 17.11631 -0.048009 0.9636 
USCEOCNFR^2 0.008101 0.050067 0.161803 0.8778 
USCEOCNFR*USGBILL3 0.309086 0.828622 0.373012 0.7244 
USCEOCNFR*USNBERBCR 1.752552 2.477472 0.707395 0.5109 
USCEOCNFR*USPROFTSB 0.000841 0.001386 0.607315 0.5702 
USGBILL3 -94.26370 298.5307 -0.315759 0.7649 
USGBILL3^2 -0.220250 2.683213 -0.082084 0.9378 
USGBILL3*USNBERBCR 12.96862 23.92281 0.542103 0.6110 
USGBILL3*USPROFTSB -0.010334 0.008890 -1.162424 0.2975 
USNBERBCR -1015.481 903.2560 -1.124245 0.3120 
USNBERBCR*USPROFTSB -0.009082 0.039556 -0.229592 0.8275 
USPROFTSB 1.433121 0.951880 1.505570 0.1925 
USPROFTSB^2 2.27E-05 7.66E-05 0.296358 0.7789 
     
     R-squared 0.824648     Adjusted R-squared -0.367748 
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Table 13: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test (Model 5)   
     
F-statistic 0.425872     Probability 0.657674 
Obs*R-squared 1.268811     Probability 0.530251 
     Dependent Variable: The residuals from model 5 (RESID)   
          
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 2.796242 23.06551 0.121230 0.9044 
USCAPUTLQ 0.048867 0.323927 0.150858 0.8813 
GDP -0.235853 0.680529 -0.346573 0.7317 
LOG(USGBILL3) -0.426438 2.336608 -0.182503 0.8566 
USCEOCNFR -0.007870 0.053931 -0.145928 0.8851 
PPI 0.118937 0.528978 0.224844 0.8239 
LOG(USPROFTSB) -0.857883 4.939808 -0.173667 0.8635 
USNBERBCR -0.152390 1.188887 -0.128179 0.8990 
USGBILL3*USPROFTSB 0.000139 0.000856 0.161858 0.8727 
PPI*USNBERBCR 0.070629 0.686965 0.102812 0.9189 
PPI^2 -0.039791 0.195095 -0.203955 0.8400 
USGBILL3^2 -0.014365 0.107133 -0.134084 0.8944 
RESID(-1) 0.218314 0.271126 0.805212 0.4280 
RESID(-2) -0.102293 0.280258 -0.364997 0.7181 
     
R-squared 0.031720     F-statistic 0.065519 
Adjusted R-squared -0.452420     Prob(F-statistic) 0.999996 
 
Table 14: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test (Model 4) 
     
     F-statistic 10.10599     Probability 0.000441 
Obs*R-squared 16.10132     Probability 0.000319 
     
     Dependent Variable: The residuals from model 4 (RESID)   
          Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -2.071168 15.27944 -0.135553 0.8931 
USCAPUTLQ 0.039559 0.209308 0.189000 0.8514 
GDP 0.243663 0.529858 0.459865 0.6489 
PPI -0.046008 0.217645 -0.211390 0.8340 
USCEOCNFR -0.013742 0.031913 -0.430591 0.6698 
USGBILL3 -0.106622 0.296428 -0.359689 0.7216 
USNBERBCR 0.025843 0.830624 0.031113 0.9754 
USPROFTSB -8.38E-05 0.000832 -0.100764 0.9204 
RESID(-1) 0.771417 0.173752 4.439772 0.0001 
RESID(-2) -0.346350 0.182283 -1.900070 0.0671 
     
     R-squared 0.402533     F-statistic 2.245776 
Adjusted R-squared 0.223293     Prob(F-statistic) 0.046752 
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Table 15: Linear regression results (Model 6), Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & 
Covariance 
Dependent Variable: USMDRATA 
   
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 113.7803 20.34535 5.592446 0.0000 
USCAPUTLQ -1.166844 0.258187 -4.519378 0.0001 
GDP -0.523995 0.488333 -1.073029 0.2913 
PPI -0.160096 0.244471 -0.654864 0.5172 
USCEOCNFR 0.041655 0.054221 0.768253 0.4480 
USGBILL3 0.959473 0.365748 2.623318 0.0132 
USNBERBCR -4.032523 1.552603 -2.597265 0.0141 
USPROFTSB -0.003386 0.001041 -3.251497 0.0027 
     
     R-squared 0.821696     Mean dependent var 21.86600 
Adjusted R-squared 0.782692     S.D. dependent var 3.776482 
S.E. of regression 1.760457     Akaike info criterion 4.145880 
Sum squared resid 99.17468     Schwarz criterion 4.483656 
Log likelihood -74.91761     F-statistic 21.06695 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.823240     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Notes: Lag truncation= 3, Sample period: 1999Q1-2008Q4 
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